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Abstract 
 
We apply cross-sectional and panel data methods to a database of 5 million patients in 8,000 English 
general practices to examine whether better primary care management of 10 chronic diseases is 
associated with reduced hospital costs. We find that only primary care performance in stroke care is 
associated with lower hospital costs.   Our results suggest that the 10% improvement in the general 
practice quality of stroke care between 2004/5 and 2007/8 reduced 2007/8 hospital expenditure by 
about £130 million in England.  The cost savings are due mainly to reductions in emergency 
admissions and outpatient visits, rather than to lower costs for patients treated in hospital or to 
reductions in elective admissions.  
 
Keywords: Quality;  disease management;  primary care;  hospital costs;  ambulatory care sensitive 
conditions;  preventative care. 
 
JEL categories: I12, I18 
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1 Introduction 
 
There is a widespread belief and hope amongst policymakers that timely disease management, in the 
form of encouraging behavioural change, self care by patients, and preventive medicine, can reduce 
demands for healthcare expenditure and improve health outcomes (HSCIC, 2005). The intention of 
GLVHDVHPDQDJHPHQW LV WRHQVXUHWKDW µDWULVN¶JURXSVRU WKRVHZLWKHVWDEOLVKHGFKURQLFFRQGLWLRQV
receive clinical best practice in the monitoring of their condition, and that recognized intermediate 
outcomes are achieved to reduce the risk of acute health deterioration. The hope is that better 
management of existing conditions and the reduction in the risk of serious complications will improve 
SDWLHQWV¶ health prospects, and reduce expected future health services expenditure (Congressional 
Budget Office, 2004). 
 
The research evidence is however equivocal (Congressional Budget Office, 2004). Most preventive 
interventions are cost-increasing, and many are not even cost-effective when compared to more 
conventional clinical interventions. Less than 20% of studies have identified cost-saving preventive 
interventions (Russell, 2009). A recent review of the economic impact of disease management 
programs for diabetes, depression, heart failure and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) 
found that only half of studies reported cost savings, mainly through reduced hospital admissions and 
specialist visits (de Bruin, 2011).   The cost-effectiveness of disease management is therefore a 
FULWLFDO LVVXH $V VXPPDUL]HG E\ &RKHQ HW DO  ³FDUHIXO DQDO\VLV RI WKH FRVWV DQG EHQHILWV RI
VSHFLILFLQWHUYHQWLRQVUDWKHUWKDQEURDGJHQHUDOL]DWLRQVLVFULWLFDO´,QRWKHUZRUGVLWLVOLNHO\WKDWWKH
precise population groups targeted, and the frequency and mode of implementation will be crucial 
GHWHUPLQDQWVRIDQLQWHUYHQWLRQ¶VLPSDFWRQKHDOWKDQGKHDOWKVHUYLFHFRVWV 
 
In an attempt to improve the quality of disease management in primary care, pay for performance 
schemes have been introduced in several countries: Australia (Scott et al, 2009), Italy (Bruni et al, 
2009), Taiwan (Lee et al, 2010), the United States (Lester et al, 2010) and the United Kingdom 
(Roland, 2004; Doran et al, 2006). Since 2004, UK general practitioners (GPs) have been subject to a 
major µSD\ IRU SHUIRUPDQFH¶ LQFHQWLYH VFKHPH NQRZQ DV WKH 4XDOLW\ DQG 2XWFRPHV )UDPHZRUN
(QOF).  The introduction of QOF was part of the new contract for the delivery of primary care.  The 
contract came with considerable additional funding for general practices, and expenditure on primary 
care in England increased from £5.8 billion in 2003/04 to £7.8 billion in 2005/06.  Under the QOF, 
about 20% of GP income was determined by practice achievement against quality indicators (National 
Audit Office, 2008).  The QOF is probably the most radical attempt to date to embed preventive 
medicine and disease management into primary care and has a large number of indicators of disease 
management quality. Given the substantial additional funding provided to support the QOF, 
policymakers will want to determine whether those practices that record a better performance against 
QOF indicators reduce the costs patients incur in other parts of the health system. 
 
A number of studies have used the detailed measures of disease management produced by the QOF 
to examine the association between practice quality scores and hospital admissions (Downing et al, 
2007; Shohet et al, 2007; Bottle et al, 2008a; Bottle et al, 2008b; Kiran et al., 2010; Purdy, 2011;  
Bankart et al, 2010; Calderón-Larrañaga A et al , 2011 ). They have found only a weak negative, and 
usually statistically insignificant, association. This might be due to the ineffective nature of the 
incentivized interventions. However, it could also be due to the use of aggregate geographic level 
data, or a relatively small samples of practices, to the use of a single year of data, to other data 
limitations, or to the characteristics of the pay-for-performance scheme (for example, the QOF quality 
indicators have upper achievement thresholds of between 50% and 90% so that practices can score 
the maximum number of points without achieving the target for all patients). 
 
Dusheiko et al (2010) avoid many of these problems in their analysis of practice emergency hospital 
admission rates for short term complications of diabetes using data on all English practices from 
2004/5 to 2006/7.  They find that moving 10% of registered diabetic patients from poor to good 
glycaemic control in an average practice was associated with a 14% decrease in the rate of 
emergency admissions for short term diabetic complications, and a £1,928 reduction in hospital costs 
per practice in 2006/7.  However, their study was at practice level and was not able to allow for the 
characteristics of individual patients in practices.   
 
Some studies have directly investigated the impact of pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives for quality 
in primary care on hospital admissions and costs. Mullen et al. (2010) found that although P4P for a 
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range of clinical quality measures in California had a positive impact on some of the clinical measures 
rewarded by the programs, there was no significant effect on avoidable hospital admissions.  Lee et 
al. (2010) reported that diabetes related examinations and physician visits increased for patients 
enrolled in a P4P disease management program in Taiwan compared with diabetic patients not 
enrolled in any P4P program, while inpatient admissions and diabetes related hospitalizations and 
expenditure fell significantly by 12% and 35%.  Chen et al. (2010) investigated the impact of P4P for 
quality of care for diabetic patients in Hawaii. Patients who saw P4P-participating physicians were 
significantly more likely to receive better quality care compared with patients who saw non±P4P-
participating physicians and improvements in care were associated with significant reductions in 
hospitalization.  Fiorentini et al (2010) found the incentives for quality in primary care reduced related 
avoidable hospitalizations in the Emilia-Romagna region.  
 
We take advantage of a major new database of hospital records for over 50 million English citizens 
linked to disease management quality indicators for their general practice to examine the association 
between quality of disease management in general practice and hospital costs.  We are able improve 
on previous studies by using QOF data for a longer time period (2004/5 to 2007/8), and by having 
detailed information on the diagnostic history of individuals. The database also enabled us to examine 
the impact of disease management on the total hospital costs for individuals as well as their costs 
relating to unplanned admissions, specialist visits and planned hospital treatments. 1   
 
Section 2 discusses how general practice disease management may affect hospital costs and 
describes the estimation methods used to detect these effects.  Section 3 describes the dataset and 
section 4 the estimation methods.  Section 5 has the results and section 6 presents some concluding 
remarks.
                                                 
1
 We do not attempt to estimate the effects of the QOF scheme on quality or on hospital costs since we have no information of 
pre QOF quality.   
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2 General practice disease management and hospital cost  
 
Disease management of chronic conditions in general practice is intended to improve the health of 
individual patients with chronic conditions via monitoring (for example, cholesterol levels for patients 
with coronary heart disease), preventive medicine (for example anti-platelet therapy for stroke 
patients, influenza immunization for vulnerable groups), and lifestyle advice for smokers or the obese.  
$ JHQHUDO SUDFWLFH¶V GLVHDVHPDQDJHPHQW FRXOG DIIHFW KRVSLWDO FRVWV for its patients in a variety of 
ways.  Patients incur hospital costs via emergency admissions, elective admissions and outpatient 
visits.  Better disease management by a general practice could alter the probabilities of these three 
types of use and/or the costs incurred if a patient uses hospital services. 
 
Ambulatory care sensitive conditions (ACSCs) are medical conditions for which adverse outcomes 
such as emergency hospital admission may be reduced by better management in primary care 
(AHRQ, 2004).   Purdy et al (2009) estimate that a set of 19 ACSCs commonly used to monitor 
aspects of National Health Service (NHS) performance accounted for 14.1% of NHS emergency 
admissions in England in 2005/6 and a larger set of 36 ACSCs accounted for 40.1%.   Thus we would 
expect that practices with better disease management of ACSCs would have fewer patients being 
admitted as emergencies for complications of ACSCs.  However, it is possible that over-zealous 
management of some ACSCs in general practice could increase certain types of emergency 
admissions.  For example, disease management of diabetic patients is aimed at reducing blood sugar 
levels and should therefore reduce emergency admissions for acute hyperglycaemic  complications.  
But excessively aggressive management of blood sugar can increase the risk of admissions for 
hypoglycaemic coma (Briscoe and Davis, 2006). The targeting of patients with specified chronic 
conditions may also divert GP efforts away from other types of patients and increase their risk of 
hospitalization.   On balance it is likely that better general practice disease management is associated 
with lower emergency admission probabilities, though there is no evidence on the overall magnitude 
of the association.  
 
It is also possible that better general practice disease management will reduce costs for patients who 
are hospitalized as emergencies if such patients are healthier, though still ill, when admitted. 
Moreover, some of the investments that practices make to improve disease management, such as 
better record systems, employing specialist nurses, and better liaison with community health staff, will 
also enable their patients to be discharged earlier because aftercare arrangements are better.   
 
The effect of better practice disease management on the costs of elective hospitalizations is less 
clear.  Some elective hospitalizations are for the treatment of patients whose chronic conditions are 
more severe. For example, patients with heart disease requiring CABGs or PTCAs are usually 
admitted as elective patients, as are diabetic patients with ophthalmic complications. If better disease 
management reduces the probability of the disease progressing to the stage where such procedures 
are required then elective admissions will be reduced.  On the other hand better disease management 
can increase the probability that patients with chronic conditions are admitted for unrelated elective 
procedures such as cataracts or hip replacements, either because they survive long enough to 
require such procedures or because patients with better controlled chronic conditions will have 
greater health gains from such procedures and may therefore be more likely to receive them. 
Improved monitoring of patients with chronic conditions may result in earlier detection of other 
conditions requiring treatment.  Again, as with emergency admissions, if general practice disease 
management means that admitted elective patients are healthier, the costs of admitted patients may 
be lower because they are likely to develop fewer complications and to have shorter lengths of stay. 
 
7KH XVH RI RXWSDWLHQW GHSDUWPHQWV E\ D SUDFWLFH¶V SDWLHQWV PD\ DOVR EH DIIHFWHG E\ LWV GLVHDVH
management.  Of the 60 million annual outpatient visits in England, around 20 million are for new 
patients referred by their GP.  More active case finding may lead to GPs referring more patients to 
hospital outpatient departments for further testing and diagnosis.  GPs may also refer more patients 
for elective procedures and the first step in this process is a referral to an outpatient department for a 
specialist to agree that the patient should receive the treatment. On the other hand elective or 
emergency admissions will often lead to follow up outpatient visits, and if better disease management 
leads to fewer inpatient stays then follow up outpatient visits will also decline. 
 
Thus, in DGGLWLRQWRH[DPLQLQJWKHHIIHFWRIGLVHDVHPDQDJHPHQWRQDSDWLHQW¶VWotal hospital costs, it 
will of interest to examine its effects on the differing types of hospital cost (arising from emergency 
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admissions, elective admissions, and outpatient visits) and to decompose these effects into those due 
to variations in the probability of use and those due to variations in the intensity of use (costs of those 
who use the hospital).   Moreover, it may also be necessary to allow for the fact that different effects 
of primary care disease management may occur with differing time lags. For example better control of 
GLDEHWLFSDWLHQWV¶EORRGVXJDUZLOOKDYHD UDSLGHIIHFWRQHPHUJHQF\DGPLVVLRQV Ior hyperglycaemic 
complications. But better monitoring of their peripheral pulses will take some years to reduce the 
likelihood of admissions for long term neuropathological complications leading to lower limb 
amputations.   Section 4 describes how we model these various effects in the light of the available 
data.
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3 Data 
 
We link two individual level and one practice level administrative databases to small area socio-
economic and demographic data.  In the English National Health Service patients who wish to obtain 
publicly funded NHS primary care services from general practitioners (GPs) must register with a 
single general practice.  We had information on all patients (over 50 million) who were registered with 
an English practice at any time between 1 April 2001 and 1 April 2008.  We also had information on 
all hospital inpatient episodes and outpatient visits for all patients admitted to English NHS hospitals 
for the same period.2  We linked the practice registration data to hospital data at individual patient 
level using pseudonymized NHS numbers.   We then attached measures of the quality of disease 
management in their practices to the patients. Finally, we attached a large set of socio-economic and 
supply side variables to the individuals based on either their small area of residence or their general 
practice. 
 
For analysis we took a 10% random sample of patients in each English practice that had at least 1000 
patients, yielding about 5 million observations per year.3   
 
3.1 Hospital expenditure 
 
For our models of patient cost the dependent variable is individual patient annual NHS hospital 
expenditure.4 We include expenditure on both outpatient attendances and all inpatient hospital spells 
finishing in that year whether they started in the year or the previous year.  We used the same set of 
unit costs obtained from the English Department of Health to cost spells in each of the years 2004/5 
to 2007/8. We exclude costs for maternity from the calculation of total hospital costs since maternity 
costs are unlikely to be affected by chronic disease management.  We also exclude mental health 
costs because of doubts about the quality of the hospital expenditure data for mental health.  For 
2007/8 31% of our sample record a non-zero hospital cost with the average cost of these patients 
being £1,383.  The average cost across all patients in our sample for 2007/8 is £427.  See Table 1 
where we also present summary statistics for average costs and probabilities of use for emergency 
admissions, elective admissions and outpatient visits.  
 
3.2 Practice disease management quality 
 
We measure practice disease management quality using data from the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (QOF), a P4P scheme covering all practices in the UK that was introduced in April 2004 
(National Audit Office, 2008). Because of the difficulty of attributing health outcomes to specific 
activities in a general practice, the QOF ties incentive payments mainly to process activities over 
which GPs have direct control and for which there is evidence of subsequent benefits to the patient 
(Doran, 2008; Roland, 2004).  The QOF was expected to lead to a reduction in avoidable hospital 
admissions by stimulating an improvement in chronic disease management (HSCIC, 2005, p2). We 
use the very rich practice level data extracted automatically from general practice electronic records 
to construct practice level measures of the quality of disease management in 10 disease areas.   
 
There were some revisions to the QOF in 2006/7 but its basic structure remained intact over the study 
period.5 In the revised version there were 136 performance indicators grouped in four domains: 
clinical (80 indicators), organizational (43 indicators), patient experience (5 indicators), and additional 
services (8 indicators).  Practices scored points for their achievement against each indicator, with the 
maximum number of points available varying across indicators.  In total a general practice could earn 
up to 1,000 points, each point worth £125 for an average practice. 675 of the points were for the 80 
clinical indicators that covered 19 groups of conditions.  QOF clinical quality determined about 10% of 
GP income. 
                                                 
2
 Some patients of English practices are treated in hospitals located in Wales and Scotland.  Previous work has shown that 
dropping the small number of patients in practices near to the borders with Wales and Scotland makes no difference to 
estimation results (Dixon et al, 2009).  
3
 Sutton et al (2007) report that a sample size of about 5 million individuals is sufficient to generate stable parameter estimates. 
4
 Financial years run from 1 April to 31 March.  Hospital data are available at  http://www.hesonline.nhs.uk/. We exclude the 
costs of patients treated privately in NHS hospitals and include the costs of patients in private hospitals who were paid for by 
the NHS.  
5
 The 2004/5 QOF had 1050 points for 146 indicators, with 76 clinical indicators in 11 disease areas accounting for 550 points 
(Department of Health, 2004). 
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We use the clinical domain indicators to measure practice disease management quality.  We ignore 
the organizational indicators because they are unlikely to have a direct effect on hospital expenditure 
and would most likely influence expenditure only through their impact on the clinical domain 
indicators.  The clinical indicators generally measured regularity of monitoring (for example, whether a 
diabetic patient's blood pressure or cholesterol had been recorded in the last 15 months) and 
intermediate outcomes, such as whether blood pressure had been successfully controlled. Practices 
were awarded points according to the proportion of eligible patients for whom each target was met, 
with points increasing linearly between a lower threshold of 40%6 up to an upper threshold that varied 
across indicators.  See Table 2 for examples of indicators for practice care of stroke patients. 
 
Setting upper thresholds below 100% of maximum attainment was intended to reduce the risk that 
GPs would inappropriately treat some patients (Roland, 2004; Doran et al 2008). However, the upper 
threshold might also discourage practices from including the most hard-to-reach patients because no 
further points are received when a practice has achieved the upper threshold (National Audit Office, 
2008, p36). 
 
Most of the clinical indicators are expressed as percentages of the eligible population, an approach 
designed to encourage practices to increase the number of treated patients from the appropriate set 
of patients. However, the eligible population for an indicator is not the number of patients with the 
disease (prevalence - which we denote P).  Practices are able to exclude some patients from the 
GHQRPLQDWRUE\GHVLJQDWLQJWKHPDVµH[FHSWLRQV¶DFFRUGLQJWRVSHFLILHGFULWHULD([FHSWLRQUHSRUWLQJ
is intended to avoid penalising practices where, for example, patients do not attend for review, or 
where a medication cannot be prescribed due to a contraindication or side-effect.  Thus the reported 
achievement used to calculate financial rewards for a clinical indicator is N/(PE) where N is the 
number for whom the indicator is achieved and E is the number exception reported for that indicator. 
 
Practices could increase their reported achievement, and hence their financial rewards, by overstating 
exceptions. There is some evidence that practices did so (Doran et al, 2008; Gravelle, Sutton and Ma; 
2010).  Thus the reported achievement rate is not an appropriate quality indicator.  Using the actual 
points earned by the practice would also be questionable because the upper thresholds for earning 
points means that, for example, two practices with reported achievements of 60% and 90% on the 
Stroke 8 indicator would get the same number of points (see Table 2).   
 
In this paper we therefore measure quality by the population achievement rates calculated as N/P (i.e. 
not adjusted for exceptions), though, as we note in the results section, measuring quality by reported 
achievement (N/(PE)) makes no substantive difference.  For each disease domain we calculate the 
domain population achievement as a weighted average of the population achievement rates on the 
indicators in that domain.  The weight attached to an indicator is the share of the maximum points that 
it attracts in the relevant clinical domain.7   
 
Some indicators refer to a subset of patients in a disease area and there is no information on the 
number of patients in these subsets to enable us to calculate our quality measure.  We therefore base 
our quality measures only on indicators that refer to all patients with a disease (Doran et al, 2006) For 
2007/8 we use 48 clinical quality indicators to calculate overall quality measures for the 10 disease 
areas shown in Table 3 that cover most of the major chronic conditions encountered in general 
practice. 
 
Table 4 has summary statistics for 2007/8 for our quality measures for the ten clinical disease areas 
and Table 5 reports their correlation coefficients. Although the rates are positively correlated, many of 
the correlations are modest, suggesting considerable variations in levels of attainment within a 
practice across different domains. The mental health achievement rate is the least well correlated with 
the other sub-domains. Correlations for other years are similar.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Except for the DEMENTIA 2 indicator where the lower threshold was 25%. 
7
 For details of the construction of the population achievement rates see Doran et al (2006). 
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3.3 Covariates 
 
We use three sets of covariates: individual needs variables, small area needs variables and indicators 
of supply.8  The individual needs variables are: 
 
(a) age (5 year bands) at the beginning of the financial year and gender (38 age/gender 
band dummies). 
 
(b) previous morbidity for each individual as measured by 152 dummy variables based on 
ICD10 inpatient diagnosis categories used by the NHS Information Centre.9  The dummy 
for a morbidity category was set equal to 1 if the individual had one or more hospital 
spells in either of the previous two years with any diagnosis in the relevant subset of 
ICD10 categories.10   
  
(c) four hospital encounter variables (the number of inpatient episodes in the previous two 
years, the number of outpatient attendances in the previous two years, and two dummy 
variables indicating whether the individual had a priority outpatient referral or received 
any treatment in the course of an outpatient attendance in the previous two years).  The 
rationale is that the number of times an individual has been admitted to hospital or 
attended an outpatient clinic in the past conveys something about the intensity of their 
morbidity experience, over and above the information contained in the binary ICD10 
morbidity variables, which do not reflect repeated spells in the same ICD10 category.  
 
(d) two indicators for whether the individual patient had a private inpatient spell or a private 
outpatient attendance in an NHS hospital in the previous two years.  Our expenditure 
measure is for costs borne by the NHS. Some patients treated in NHS hospitals choose 
to pay to be treated as private patients to reduce their waiting times or to be able to 
choose their surgeon.  Individuals who have been private patients in the past are more 
likely to use private provision in the future, and will therefore, other things equal, incur 
less NHS expenditure.  
 
For the attributed (small area) needs variables we had over 160 small area level measures of 
population socio-economic characteristics that might plausibly be linked to variations in hospital 
utilization. These included data from the 2001 Census and the Indices of Multiple Deprivation 2007 
that were attributed to each individual via their Lower Super Output Area of residence.11  We also had 
information on disease prevalence rates for each practice derived from the rates reported by practices 
as part of the QOF.   
 
The attributed supply variables included over 90 measures of local health system characteristics that 
might affect hospital utilization. They included practice characteristics such as the number of patients 
per GP and measures of the accessibility of different types of health care facilities from the small area 
in which the patient lives.  The supply variables also included measures of accessibility such as 
distance to providers and waiting times at local hospitals. 
 
We also included 151 dummy variables for the Primary Care Trust (PCT) responsible for the general 
practice with which the individual is registered.  PCTs were the administrative entity with prime 
responsibility for purchasing NHS services from local hospitals on behalf of their local populations, 
typically about 350,000 individuals. The dummies are intended to capture factors such as variations in 
aggregate PCT spending levels and PCT commissioning policies that may affect hospital costs.  
Because patients in many PCTs tend to use one main hospital provider the PCT dummies will also 
pick up variations in hospital diagnosis recording practices, and hospital treatment thresholds.12  
 
                                                 
8
 These variables are more fully described in PBRA Team (2010). 
9
 See http://www.hesonline.nhs.uk/Ease/servlet/ContentServer?siteID=1937&categoryID=202. 
10
 The morbidity indicators do not indicate severity of the condition, merely its presence or absence.  It would be useful in future 
work to include more refined measures of mobidity for particular conditions from data sets based on practice clinical records. 
11
 See http://www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination/.    There are  32,482 lower super output areas (LSOAs) with a 
minimum population of 997 and a mean population of 1,513. 
12
 We also estimated models using the proportion of a pUDFWLFH¶VH[SHQGLWXUHLQFXUUHGDWHDFKKRVSLWDOLQ(QJODQGWRFRQWUROIRU
hospital effects with very similar results. 
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4  Estimation  
 
Given the large samples of data together with the extensive set of covariates to be considered, we 
adopt a pragmatic approach, starting with cross-sectional models for exploratory analyses and 
building up to dynamic panel data models. The cross-sectional models allow us to explore 
specification of models that capture the impact of practice quality on hospital costs while controlling 
for confounding factors. They also allow us to investigate the impact of different practice quality 
measures and the lag between quality and hospital costs. The impact of quality is then explored 
separately for total costs (zero and positive expenditures) arising from emergency admission, elective 
admissions and outpatient visits. We then consider the impact of disease management on the 
probability of incurring hospital expenditure and separately on the level of costs conditional on having 
incurred expenditures (positive expenditures only). Finally, we estimate dynamic panel data models of 
total hospital costs controlling for persistence in individual expenditures and heterogeneity in practice 
effects brought about, for example, by differences in referral decisions.  
 
The distribution of total hospital costs for individuals generally has a spike at zero and a long right-
hand tail. They also tend to be heteroskedastic. In small to moderate samples these characteristics 
can be challenging to ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and alternatives including generalized 
linear models and ordinary least squares on a transformed dependent variable are often used (e.g. 
Buntin and Zaslavsky, 2004; Manning et a;, 2005).  For the dataset used in this study the 
performance of alternative estimators was investigated in depth and it was found that, because of the 
very large sample sizes available, OLS models of untransformed expenditure outperformed 
alternatives in terms of predictive power (Dixon et al, 2009). This is in line with findings from other 
researchers using large samples (Dunn et al, 2003, Ellis and McGuire, 2007).  Accordingly, when 
modelling the level of costs we estimate linear specifications using OLS (and panel data counterparts) 
in what follows.  
 
4.1 Cross section models 
 
We first estimate cross section models of total hospital costs  
 
 0ijp jp q ijp x ijp m ijp n ijp v ijp sc q x m n v sE E E E E E Ec c c c c c       p PCT ijpPCT E Hc              (1) 
 
where  is expenditure in the financial year 2007/08 on patient i in practice j in PCT p on 1 April 
2007. q
 
is a vector of measures of general practice disease management quality, x
 
is a vector of 37 
age and gender dummies. m is a vector of 152 morbidity indicators based on ICD10 diagnoses for 
inpatient episodes and v vector of 4 encounter variables, with both vectors based on data from the 
previous two years.  n is vector of small area needs variables attributed to individuals on the basis of 
their place of residence and s a vector of supply variables based on practice characteristics and 
accessibility of health care facilities (all as of 1 April 2007). PCT is a vector of 151 PCT dummy 
variables and H  is an error term. The model is estimated via OLS using practice cluster robust 
standard errors.  
 
We retained vectors of individual characteristics x, m and v in all specifications. However, the initial 
model had over 500 potential explanatory variables including 250 attributed needs and supply 
characteristics (n, v, s). To search for a parsimonious specification of the attributed variables from 
these latter variables we start from a full model (containing all variables) and eliminate attributed 
variables on the basis of their t statistics.  We first drop attributed variables with _t_ < 0.2 and re-
estimate and drop attributed variables with _t_ < 0.4.  We repeat increasing the required absolute t 
statistic until all remaining attributed variables have _t_ 2.00.  We then drop attributed variables with 
counter-intuitive signs, and re-estimate the models. We repeat these steps until only those attributed 
variables with a significance level of 1% or better. The resulting model is then used as the basis for 
investigating the impact of quality measures on hospital costs.   
 
We next estimate probit cross-section models of the probability of incurring hospital expenditure in 
2007/8  Pr ijpy , where yijp = 1 if cijp > 0 and yijp  otherwise, with practice cluster robust standard 
errors.  We also estimate OLS cross section models for individuals with positive expenditure cijp > 0, 
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again with practice cluster robust standard errors.   We use the set of regressors selected in the final 
parsimonious version of (1).   
 
4.2  Panel data models 
 
We extend the cross-sectional analysis to exploit the longitudinal dimension of the data and estimate 
panel data models for 2004/5 to 2007/8  
 
 0ijpt jpt q ijpt x ijpt m ijpt n ijpt v ijpt sc q x m n v sE E E E E E Ec c c c c c           
       2p PCT t jp ijptPCT E M P Hc      (2) 
 
Mt is a year effect, Pjp is a practice-specific time invariant error term and H2ijpt is a time and individual 
pooled error term.  Note that the pooled error term could be decomposed into an unobserved 
individual specific effect and an idiosyncratic error term: H2ijpt = Dijp + ]ijpt. However, due to 
computational constraints of estimating three-way error-component panel data models with such a 
large set of variables and observations we pool these two components of the error.  This is unlikely to 
be overly restrictive given that variability in the quality measures occurs across time and practices and 
not across individuals within practices.  
 
First we estimate (2) assuming, separately, that the Pjp are fixed and random practice effects. We then 
use a dynamic specification by including an autoregressive one-period lag of the expenditure variable 
to reflect persistence, or state dependence, in the use of health care not fully reflected through the set 
of morbidity and encounter variables: 
 
 0 1ijpt jpt q ijpt x ijpt m ijpt n ijpt v ijpt s ijptc q x m n v s cE E E E E E E J c c c c c c            
       2p PCT t jp ijptPCT E M P Hc      (3) 
 
Persistence in health expenditures is captured through the parameter  .  For example, should an 
individual experience a shock to health (via H2ijpt) resulting in higher hospital expenditure in period t, 
then ÖJ > 0 will imply that health care expenditures will be higher in future periods.  
 
To derive consistent estimates of the parameters of (3) we need to allow for the correlation between 
the lagged dependent variable cijpt-1 and the error H2ijpt and in particular via an unobserved individual 
effect ie H2ijpt =Dijp + ]ijpt. In the context of models with discrete outcomes this is often referred to as the 
problem of initial conditions (Wooldridge, 2002) proposes an approach to deal with the initial 
conditions problem intended for non-linear dynamic random effects panel data models. It involves 
modelling the distribution of the unobserved effect conditional on the initial value of the dependent 
variable (first wave observation) and any exogenous explanatory variables (see Contoyannis et al. 
(2004) for an application). Following the spirit of this approach but adapting to our linear model we 
parameterise the unobserved individual effect as follows:   
 
 2 0 1 1 2ijp ijp ijp ijpc zD N N N Hc           (4) 
 
where ijpz is a vector of the average values over time within individuals of the exogenous variables 
(x,m,n,s).  Hijp is an error term assumed to be independent of ijpzc , q, the initial condition cijp1 and the 
residual pooled error term (H2ijpt  D2ijp).  Substituting (4) into (3) gives a model with regressors at time t 
augmented to include cijp1 (costs in year 2004/5) and ijpz . This model can then be estimated using 
random practice effects.  Note that we would expect the coefficient 1ÖN  to be positive as it is 
informative about the relationship between the individual unobserved effect and initial hospital 
expenditures.  
 
Blundell, et al. (2002) suggest modelling individual heterogeneity in dynamic count data models as a 
function of baseline or pre-sample averages of the dependent variable and show this to perform well 
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in simulations.  To further control for practice level heterogeneity we adapt this approach by averaging 
individual baseline costs cijp1 across individuals within practices to construct a variable representing 
practice baseline costs based on data from the initial period 2004/5. In a similar way to the 
augmented regression in (4), this constructed variable 1jpc  can used as a regressor in the 
parameterization of the unobserved practice effect as 0 1 1jp jp jpcP W W H   .  
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5 Results  
 
5.1 Cross-section models for 2007/8 total cost 
 
Although our final parsimonious model contained only five of the 250 attributed needs and supply 
variables, there was only a small loss in explanatory power compared with the initial model with a full 
set of covariates (the 2R fell from 0.2662 to 0.2654).  The signs and coefficients on the covariates 
from the parsimonious model are generally plausible.13  The variables that make the largest 
contribution to explanatory power are the 152 past morbidity indicators and the age/gender 
categories.  Unsurprisingly, individuals with past morbidity generally have higher costs.  Costs for both 
males and females decrease with age until 25 years and then increase (see Appendix Table A1).  
There is no hump at child bearing age for women because maternity costs are excluded from the total 
cost dependent variable.     
 
The coefficients on the four hospital encounter variables are significant and positive. They imply that, 
for example, the number of times an individual has been admitted to hospital or attended outpatients 
in the past conveys something about the intensity of their morbidity experience, over and above the 
information contained in the binary ICD10 morbidity variables. The two private health care variables 
have a negative effect on NHS costs. This is as expected since individuals who have been private 
patients in the past are more likely to use private facilities in the future when they are ill and thus will 
generate lower NHS expenditure.  The five attributed small areas needs variables that are significant 
in the final parsimonious model have plausible signs but make a very small contribution to explanatory 
power of the model because of the presence of the individual level past morbidity variables and the 
age/gender coefficients.  
 
Our focus is on the ten disease management quality measures for general practices.  Only the 
measure for stroke care quality is statistically significant with a coefficient of 0.664 (Table 6, model 
1).14 We also estimated the cross-section parsimonious model for 2007/8 costs, replacing the current 
QOF stroke score for 2007/8 with the stroke score for previous years (models 2 to 4 in Table 6).  The 
estimated effect of lagged quality on 2007/8 expenditure is smaller the greater the lag, falling from 
0.664 for current stroke quality to 0.322 for 2004/5 stroke quality.15  
 
We undertook robustness checks by forcing the other nine QOF quality measures into models. Model 
1 in Table 7 shows the coefficients on the disease domain quality measures when all ten are included 
in the regression.  Three of the coefficients are positive, though not statistically significant, six are 
negative and statistically insignificant, and only the stroke quality measure is negative and significant.  
The estimated effect of stroke quality in this model is very similar to its effect when the nine 
insignificant quality measures are dropped (model 1, Table 6).    
 
We also computed an aggregate quality measure as the weighted average of the 10 disease domain 
measures and found that it is negative and significant when it is included as the only QOF quality 
measure (Table 7, model 2).  The coefficient on the aggregate measure is very similar to that on the 
stroke score in the earlier model.   Finally, we estimated 10 separate models for total hospital cost 
forcing one of the 10 quality measures into each model.  The coefficients from on the quality 
measures from these 10 separate models are reported in column 3 of Table 7. Four quality measures 
(asthma, chronic heart disease, diabetes, hypothyroidism) are separately significantly negatively 
associated with expenditure but the coefficients are smaller and less precise than that on stroke care 
quality.16 
                                                 
13
 Appendix Table A1 reports coefficients on age/gender, past hospital use, and attributed needs and supply variables for the 
main cross-section and panel data models. The complete set of coefficients (including the individual past morbidity dummies 
and PCT dummies) are in the working paper Dushieko et al (2011).  
14
 The coefficient on stroke care quality was robust to the nesting down process. The coefficient in the full model with all 250 
attributed needs and supply variables was 0.565 (t: 2.23). 
15
 Most of the indicators in the clinical domains reflect practice achievement in the 15 months to the financial year end (that is, 
the QOF indicators for 2007/8 reflect practice achievement from January 2007 to March 2008).  This will be slightly (three 
months) behind of the cost variable which relates to inpatient episodes and outpatient attendances finishing between April 2007 
and March 2008.   
16
 We also estimated models with the quality measure constructed using patients reported eligible by the practice PE, rather 
than those with the disease P (see section 3.2). For the cross section model the coefficient on the stroke quality measure is 
reduced slightly from 0.644 (SE 0.190) to 0.602 (SE 0.219).The reduction in the estimated coefficient is probably because 
removing exceptions from the denominator in the quality measure is akin to a rescaling which increases the magnitude of the 
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In the light of the consistent results from the simple cross-section models we decided to restrict 
attention in more sophisticated models to the effects of stroke care quality and to use the same 
parsimonious specification.  
 
5.2 Two part cross section models 
 
Table 8 reports estimates of two part models for all hospital expenditures, and for expenditure 
disaggregated for emergency, elective and outpatient attendances. Higher quality stroke care was 
significantly associated with a lower probability of any hospital expenditure and reduced hospital 
expenditure conditional on incurring any expenditure. A 1% increase in quality was associated with a 
decrease in the probability of positive expenditures of 0.0002 against a mean probability of 0.309 
(elasticity 0.05).  A 1% improvement in stroke care quality was associated with a £2 reduction in total 
hospital costs (elasticity 0.12) for those with any costs.  We also ran a two part model with log costs 
and the stroke quality coefficient was 0.0009 (SE 0.0002).   
 
Higher quality was associated with significantly lower emergency and outpatient visit expenditures, 
but not with elective costs. The reduction in emergency expenditures was driven by a significant 
reduction in the probability of admission. A 1% improvement in stroke quality was associated with a 
0.00007 decrease in the probability of emergency admission (elasticity 0.11). There was a negative 
but insignificant association with emergency expenditure conditional on the patient being admitted. 
The significant decrease in outpatient expenditures was due to significant reductions in both the 
probability of a visit (elasticity 0.51) and the cost of visits conditional on any outpatient expenditure 
(elasticity 0.01).    
 
5.3 Panel data models 
 
Results of panel data estimates are presented in Table 9.17  Column 1 presents results from a fixed 
practice effects model.18 This estimator controls for unobserved practice-level effects correlated with 
both quality and expenditure. It relies on variation in QOF scores within practices over time to identify 
the impact of quality on costs.  The estimate of the effect of stroke quality is negative (0.091), a great 
deal smaller than the corresponding cross-sectional estimate (Table 8, column 1) and not significant. 
This is likely to reflect the relative lack of variation in practice QOF scores over time compared to the 
cross-sectional model estimate where the impact of quality is identified through variation across 
practices. The discrepancy may also reflect the bias in the cross-sectional estimates due to 
correlation between unobserved practice heterogeneity associated with quality of care and patient 
costs.    
 
Column 2 is the corresponding random effects specification with a practice-specific error component.  
The coefficient on the stroke QOF score (0.193) is smaller than the cross-section estimate but larger 
than the fixed effects estimate in model 1 and is significant at the 1% level.19  
 
Column 3 presents the results of the dynamic panel specification (3)  augmented with the individual 
effect specified as in (4).  The coefficient on the stroke QOF score is 0.266, which is greater than the 
corresponding coefficient in the random effects model and is significant at the 5% level. The model 
controls for individual heterogeneity in costs by directly allowing for persistence over time together 
with a random GP practice error component. The significant coefficient on lagged cost is 0.125, so a 
negative health shock that increases costs in one period will increase future costs but at a rapidly 
                                                                                                                                                        
explanatory variable and hence reduces the magnitude of the coefficient. We also ran models including measures of the share 
RIHDFKSUDFWLFH¶VDGPLVVLRQVDWHDFKKRVSLWDO7KHVWURNHFRHIILFLHQWZDVDJDLQUHGXFHGVOLJKWO\0.609 (SE 0.219).  We tested 
for robustness to estimation methods by running a cross section GLM model with a log link and gamma distribution for total 
hospital costs.  The coefficient on the stroke quality score was again negative and significant 0.0016 (SE 0.0005). 
17
 For the panel models, a 10% sample of patients registered with each general practice with a list size of at least 1000 at 1 
April 2004 was selected (n=5,131,161), and  practice registration details along with the LSOA of residence were added for 
these patients as at 1 April 2005,  1 April 2006, and 1 April 2007.  The panel sample thus excludes people born after 1 April 
2004 but it includes patients alive at 1 April 2004 but who die at some point during the next four years.  
18
 We further attempted individual fixed effects estimation. However, due to a lack of within individual variability in key variables 
of interest (notably the QOF score) from which to identify parameters, estimation yielded poor and imprecise estimates. 
19
 Using quality measures constructed with PE rather than P (see section 3.2) for the random practice effects model (model 2 
the coefficient is reduced to 0.152 (SE 0.082). 
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diminishing rate. The coefficient on the initial period individual cost is positive indicating the expected 
positive correlation between the unobserved individual-specific effects and costs.  
 
Column 4 has results from augmenting the dynamic panel model by including the baseline 2004/5 
mean practice cost to provide additional control for practice level heterogeneity. The absolute value of 
the coefficient on the practice stroke quality score decreases slightly to 0.255.  
 
We repeat the model in column 4 separately for emergency, elective and outpatient visit costs. The 
results confirm that the significant association between better quality of practice stroke care and 
hospital expenditure is driven primarily by prevention of emergency admission and subsequent 
specialist follow up care than by reductions in elective hospital treatments. The coefficient on lagged 
costs is much smaller for emergency cost than for outpatient and elective expenditures. suggesting 
that emergency costs are less persistent.20   
 
The mean practice stroke quality increased by ten percentage points between 2004/5 and 2007/8.  
The average practice population was 5700 so that the RE model dynamic model with baseline 
individual and mean practice costs (column 4, Table 9) suggests that the improvement in quality of 
care of stroke patients reduced annual expenditure on the patients of an average practice by 
£10*0.255*5700 = £14,535 (95% CI: £1,464-£27,606). Nationally, with an English population in 2007 
of 51.1 million, the improvement in stroke care in general practice may have reduced 2007/8 hospital 
expenditure by £130million (95% CI: £13.1million £247million) compared with 2004/5. The significant 
positive coefficient on one period lagged expenditure (0.125) implies that the total cost saving from a 
one off increase in  2007/8 stroke quality of 10%  which reduced total 2008/9 cost by £130 million  
should also include a reduction in 2007/8 expenditure of 0.125*£130million = £16 million.  
                                                 
20
 The difference is not due to the relative magnitude of costs in these three categories as average emergency costs exceed 
average elective and outpatient costs.   
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6 Conclusions 
 
This study has taken advantage of a major new data set that links practice-based patient registration 
data, patient level hospital use data, and GP practice clinical quality data to examine whether higher 
quality of disease management in primary care is associated with reduced hospital costs. Applying 
cross-section and panel data methods to a data set of 5 million individuals, with a very rich set of 
covariates, we find that the current QOF stroke quality score almost always has a statistically 
significant negative association with patients' hospital costs in the same year.  Once stroke quality 
was allowed for, hospital costs were not affected by the quality of primary care disease management 
for any of the other nine conditions for which we had data.  
 
The reduction in total hospital expenditure associated with better quality of practice stroke care is due 
primarily to a reduction in the probability of emergency hospitalization and in outpatient visits.  There 
were negative but small and insignificant associations between quality and elective expenditure, 
which suggests that better monitoring of patients has not lead to increased costs arising from 
increased referrals by GPs to secondary care. Since we measure costs for all patients in practices, 
not just those whose disease management was incentivized under the QOF, our estimates allow for 
the possibility of diversion of preventive efforts in primary care away from other primary care patients. 
There was also significant persistence over time in secondary care medical costs indicating the longer 
term importance of better disease management.  There are weaker, but still statistically significant 
associations of 2007/8 hospital costs with general practice stroke quality in earlier years. The study 
demonstrates the importance of using panel data methods to control for unobserved patient and 
practice heterogeneity in non-randomized studies when assessing the impact of quality of care on 
patient outcomes.  
 
Whilst we suggest a modest association between this aspect of primary care disease management 
and hospital costs, we do not claim that improved primary care will reduce lifetime health care costs. 
As is well-known, the majority of disease prevention strategies generate additional costs (Cohen et al, 
2008). Our focus is solely on the annual impact on contemporaneous secondary care costs when 
there is an improvement in primary care prevention. We do not consider, for example, the £1 billion 
paid to general practices for their QOF achievements, nor the additional pharmaceutical and primary 
care costs associated with meeting QOF stroke targets, nor the impact on total lifetime healthcare 
costs if the patient lives longer as a result of better primary care.  Ideally a full evaluation would use 
measures of disease management quality for individuals rather than at the practice level as in this 
paper and would also incorporate data on morbidity from practice records, rather than from just from 
hospital records. A full evaluation of primary care disease management must also take account of its 
effect on the future time stream of health and on costs.  But the reduction in hospital costs due to 
better primary care disease management is part of the gains to be included in the evaluation.  
 
In summary, we are cautious about drawing inferences of causality from our analysis, but feel that the 
panel data results do offer solid grounds for believing that improvements in primary care disease 
management do not increase hospital costs, and that for at least some conditions, better 
management materially reduces hospital costs. 
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Table 1.  Costs and use for 2007/8 
  All hospital use Emergency 
inpatient 
Elective 
inpatient 
Outpatient Other 
Average cost (sd) for all patients (£) 427 
(2,067) 
150 
(1,086) 
144 
(1,338) 
119 
(451) 
14 
(410) 
Probability of positive cost 30.85% 5.54% 7.55% 28.74% 0.30% 
Average cost (sd) for patients with 
positive cost (£) 
1,383 
(3,539) 
2,707 
(3,791) 
1,904 
(4,513) 
414 
(765) 
4,710 
(5,818) 
Notes.  For random sample of 5,170,603 patients on lists of English practices with at least 1000 patients at 1 April 2007.  
([FOXGHVPDWHUQLW\ DQG PHQWDO KHDOWK 7KH ³2WKHU´ FDWHJRU\ LQFOXGHV SDWLHQWV WUDQVIHUUHG EHWZHHQ KRVpitals and where the 
admission method is not known. 
 
 
Table 2.  QOF indicators used to construct measure of practice quality of care for stroke patients  
  Upper  
threshold 
Available  
points 
STROKE 5 % who have a record of blood pressure in the notes in the 
preceding 15 months 
90 2 
STROKE 6 % in whom the last blood pressure reading (measured in the 
last 15 months) is  150/90 or less 
70 5 
STROKE 7 % who have a record of total cholesterol in the last 15 
months 
90 2 
STROKE 8 % whose last measured total cholesterol (measured in the 
last 15 months) is 5 mmol/l or less 
60 5 
STROKE 10 % who have had influenza immunisation in the preceding 1 
September to 31 March 
85 2 
STROKE 12 %who have a record that an anti-platelet agent (aspirin, 
clopidogrel, dipyridamole or a combination), or an anti-
coagulant is being taken  (unless a contraindication or side-
effects are recorded 
90 4 
Notes.  TIA: transient ischemic attack.  For '%' read 'the percentage of patients'.  Indicators Stroke 5 to Stroke 12 have lower 
payment thresholds of 40%.   Source: NHS Employers (no date) . 
 
 
Table 3.  Disease domains in the Quality and Outcomes Framework 2007/8 used to construct general 
practice disease management quality measures  
 Number of 
indicators in 
measure 
Total points 
available 
   
Asthma 2 35 
CHD 9 85 
CKD 3 21 
COPD 4 30 
Dementia 1 15 
Diabetes 15 87 
Hypertension 2 77 
Hypothyroidism 1 6 
Mental health 5 35 
Stroke 6 20 
Total 48 411 
Notes. Source: NHE Employers (no date).  CHD: coronary heart disease; CKD: chronic kidney disease; COPD: chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease.  Note: not all indicators were used to construct our composite quality scores (see section 3 for 
further details).   
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics for general practice disease management quality measures 2007/8 
QOF quality measure Number of 
practices 
Weighted average population achievement (%) 
Mean SD Min Max 
Asthma  8289 76.38 9.11 0.00 100 
CHD  8284 82.74 3.85 35.00 100 
CKD  8251 97.68 2.57 50.00 100 
COPD  8279 81.97 8.61 0.00 100 
Dementia  8200 75.44 17.48 0.00 100 
Diabetes  8290 87.42 5.57 9.38 100 
Hypertension  8292 91.28 4.11 14.87 100 
Hypothyroidism  8281 95.37 3.78 9.09 100 
Mental health  8284 74.73 13.66 0.00 100 
Stroke  8276 86.17 5.77 6.67 100 
Notes: population achievement for an indicator i in disease domain k is defined as Nik/Pk where Nik is the number of patients for 
whom the indicator is achieved and Pk is the number of patients with the disease. The quality measure for a disease domain is 
a weighted average of population achievement on each indicator in the domain, where the weights are the maximum points 
available for the indicator.   
 
 
Table 5. Correlation coefficients for general practice disease management quality measures 2007/8   
 Asthma CHD CKD COPD Dementia Diabetes Hyper-
tension 
Hypo-
thyroidism 
Mental 
Health 
CHD 0.349         
CKD 0.212 0.266        
COPD 0.356 0.485 0.194       
Dementia 0.257 0.216 0.129 0.226      
Diabetes 0.368 0.536 0.245 0.484 0.218     
Hypertension  0.406 0.476 0.336 0.373 0.229 0.489    
Hypothyroidism 0.272 0.368 0.210 0.296 0.179 0.400 0.455   
Mental Health 0.329 0.210 0.137 0.225 0.285 0.212 0.213 0.110  
Stroke 0.343 0.607 0.301 0.466 0.225 0.530 0.484 0.371 0.234 
Note: the number of practices is 8,178. 
 
 
Table 6.  Association of general practice stroke management quality with 2007/8 hospital expenditure: cross section 
models  
 1 2 3 4 
Stroke 2007/8  -0.664***    
 [0.190]    
Stroke 2006/7  -0.531***   
  [ 0.169]   
Stroke 2005/6   -0.460***  
   [ 0.145]  
Stroke 2004/5    -0.322** 
    [ 0.124] 
     
Observations 5170603 5170603 5170603 5166983 
R2 0.265 0.265 0.265 0.265 
Notes:  Dependent variable: patient hospital expenditure in 2007/8.  Reported coefficients are effect of a 1% increase in clinical 
SRSXODWLRQDFKLHYHPHQW LQDSDWLHQW¶VSUDFWLFHRQWKHSDWLHQW¶VKRVSLWDOH[SHQGLWXUH 5REXVWVWDQGDUGHUURUV LQEUDFNHWVZLWh 
clustering by PCT. 
All models also contain 37 age/gender bands, 152 ICD10 morbidity dummies for 2006/7 and 2005/6,  4 hospital encounter 
variables for 2006/7, 2005/6, 2 private patient measures for 2006/7 and 2005/6,  5 attributed needs variables, 151 PCT 
dummies. See Sections 2 and 3 for details. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7.  Association of 2007/8 general practice disease management quality measures with 2007/8 
hospital costs   
 1 
All quality 
measures 
in single 
regression 
2 
Overall 
quality 
3 
Quality 
measures 
entered in 
separate 
regressions 
Asthma -0.153  -0.241** 
 [ 0.127]  [ 0.099] 
Coronary heart disease  -0.028  -0.637** 
 [ 0.385]  [0.297] 
Chronic kidney disease -0.013  -0.442 
 [0.437]  [0.395] 
COPD 0.099  -0.158 
 [0.180]  [0.152] 
Dementia -0.039  -0.090 
 [0.062]  [0.059] 
Diabetes 0.037  -0.374** 
 [0.237]  [0.182] 
Hypertension 0.462  -0.213 
 [0.376]  [0.251] 
Hypothyroidism -0.387  -0.657* 
 [0.438]  [0.372] 
Mental health -0.046  -0.115 
 [0.077]  [0.072] 
Stroke -0.666**  -0.664*** 
 [0.258]  [0.190] 
Overall quality  -0.698***  
  [0.236]  
 
   
Observations 5,170,603 5,170,603 5,170,603 
R2 [  0.265] [  0.265]  
Notes: Dependent variable in all models is 2007/8 hospital expenditure.  Reported coefficients are effect of a 1% increase in 
FOLQLFDOSRSXODWLRQDFKLHYHPHQWLQDSDWLHQW¶VSUDFWLFHRQWKHSDWLHQW¶VKRVSLWDOH[SHQGLWXUHRobust standard errors in brackets 
with clustering by PCT. All models are cross section and also contain 37 age/gender bands, 152 ICD10 morbidity dummies for 
2006/7 and 2005/6,  4 hospital encounter variables for 2006/7, 2005/6, 2 private patient measures for 2006/7 and 2005/6,  5 
attributed needs variables, 151 PCT dummies. (See Sections 3 and 4 for details.)  All 10 models reported in column 3 had the 
same R2 of 0.265.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Does better disease management in primary care reduce hospital costs?  21  
 
 
 
Table 8. Association of general practice stroke management quality with costs and use for different types of hospital cost, 2007/8 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 _________All hospital use_______ ________Emergency admissions____ _______Elective admissions______ ________Outpatient visits_________ 
 Total cost 
(OLS) 
Part 1 
Prob use 
(probit) 
Part 2 
Cost if use 
(OLS) 
Total cost 
(OLS) 
Part 1 
Prob  
admission 
(probit) 
Part 2 
Cost if 
admitted 
(OLS) 
Total cost 
(OLS) 
Part 1 
Prob 
admission 
(probit) 
Part 2 
Cost if 
admitted 
(OLS) 
Total cost 
(OLS) 
Part 1 
Prob visit 
(probit) 
Part 2 
Cost if visit 
(OLS) 
Stroke QOF 
score 
coefficient 
-0.664*** -0.00066** -1.996*** -0.319*** -0.00071*** -1.970 -0.089 -0.00042 -1.406 -0.164** -0.00061** -0.400** 
[0.190] [0.00026] [0.602] [0.096] [0.00026] [1.431] [0.113] [0.00027] [1.324] [0.063] [0.00026] [0.197] 
             
Av marginal 
effect 
 -0.00019**   -0.00007***   -0.000052   -0.0017**  
 [0.00007]   [0.000025]   [0.000034]   [0.00007]  
             
N 5,170,603 5,170,603 1,595,303 5,170,603 5,170,603 286,629 5,170,603 5,170,603 390,245 5,170,603 5,170,603 1,486,211 
R2 0.2654 0.1940 0.2502 0.0986 0.1314 0.1421 0.0977 0.1276 0.3943 0.2062 0.1929 0.0936 
Notes: All models are cross section and also contain 37 age/gender bands, 152 ICD10 morbidity dummies for 2006/7 and 2005/6,  4 hospital encounter variables for 2006/7, 2005/6, 2 private patient 
measures for 2006/7 and 2005/6,  5 attributed needs variables, and 151 PCT dummies. See Sections 2 and 3 for details.  The R2 is a pseudo-R-squared for the probit models. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
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 Table 9. Panel data models for patient hospital costs 2004/5 - 2007/8  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
fixed practice 
effects 
random 
practice effects 
random 
practice effects 
random 
practice effects 
random 
practice 
effects 
random 
practice effects 
random 
practice effects 
 
all costs all costs all costs all costs emergency 
costs only 
elective costs 
only 
outpatient 
costs only 
stroke QOF score  -0.091 -0.193** -0.266** -0.255** -0.245*** 0.072 -0.058** 
 
[0.135] [0.085] [0.117] [0.117] [0.078] [0.065] [0.026] 
     
   
lagged individual cost 
  
0.125*** 0.125*** 0.053*** 0.205*** 0.558*** 
   
[0.005] [0.005] [0.002] [0.011] [0.030] 
     
   
base individual cost 
  
0.016*** 0.016*** 0.046*** 0.013 0.088*** 
   
[0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.011] [0.015] 
     
   
base practice cost 
   
0.032*** 0.024*** 0.023** 0.105*** 
    
[0.007] [0.008] [0.009] [0.007] 
     
   
Observations (NT) 19,701,431 19,701,431 14,590,999 14,590,999 14,590,999 14,590,999 14,590,999 
Individuals (N) 5,123,157 5,123,157 5,005,347 5,005,347 5,005,347 5,005,347 5,005,347 
     
   
Within R2 0.2047 0.2031 0.2091 0.2091 0.0691 0.2825 0.2937 
Between R2 n/a 0.7414 0.7007 0.7006 0.5508 0.6644 0.8632 
Overall R2 n/a 0.2043 0.2103 0.2103 0.0699 0.2832 0.2979 
Note:  The dependent variable in all models is individual hospital cost in a year.  Model 1 is a fixed (practice) effects model with robust standard errors clustered by general practice. Model 2 is a 
random (practice) effects model with robust standard errors clustered by practice.  Model 3 is the same as model 2 with the addition of lagged individual cost and baseline individual cost.  Model 4 is 
the same as model 3 with the addition of baseline practice cost.  Models 5 ± 7 are the same as model 4 but employ a different measure of cost as the dependent variable and as regressors.  All 
models also contain 37 age/gender bands, 152 ICD10 morbidity dummies, 4 hospital encounter variables, 2 private patient measures,  5 attributed needs variables, 3 year dummies and 151 PCT 
dummies. See Sections 2 and 3 for details. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix A1: Summary of modelling results   
Table A1 Determinants of individual hospital costs 
One period 
cross-
section 
model, 
2007/8 
Panel data models, 2004/5-2007/8 
OLS 
Fixed 
practice 
effects 
Random 
practice 
effects 
Random 
practice 
effects 
Random 
practice 
effects 
Random 
practice 
effects 
Random 
practice 
effects 
Random 
practice 
effects 
all costs all costs all costs all costs all costs 
emergency 
costs only 
elective 
costs only 
outpatient 
costs 
only 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Demographic variables 
males aged < 1 197.419*** 165.777*** 166.433*** 
[17.287] [13.691] [13.684] 
males aged 1-4 -2.405 -10.080*** -9.873*** -8.601** -8.597** -14.991*** -8.546*** 7.524*** 
[5.080] [3.098] [3.095] [3.685] [3.685] [2.757] [1.861] [0.982] 
males aged 5-9 -20.949*** -20.829*** -20.425*** -22.129*** -22.191*** -12.320*** -13.768*** 1.802** 
[3.789] [2.104] [2.100] [2.285] [2.285] [1.334] [1.314] [0.747] 
males aged 10-14 -2.121 -2.398 -2.105 -5.412** -5.518** -1.553 -16.942*** 8.937*** 
[3.087] [2.027] [2.021] [2.272] [2.272] [1.387] [1.310] [0.771] 
males aged 15-19 -9.816*** -10.526*** -10.257*** -12.963*** -13.087*** 5.582*** -14.648*** -4.961*** 
[3.654] [2.248] [2.239] [2.491] [2.492] [1.590] [1.326] [0.555] 
males aged 20-24 -12.602*** -10.898*** -11.892*** -10.279*** -9.817*** 2.200 -7.905*** -3.775*** 
[3.648] [2.123] [2.111] [2.409] [2.407] [1.500] [1.276] [0.625] 
males aged 25-29 -18.198*** -17.334*** -17.447*** -16.983*** -16.686*** -4.240*** -6.617*** -4.658*** 
[3.380] [2.073] [2.067] [2.357] [2.356] [1.486] [1.343] [0.545] 
males aged 30-34 -14.297*** -15.341*** -15.332*** -15.034*** -14.917*** -5.988*** -3.073** -3.663*** 
[3.352] [2.016] [2.010] [2.311] [2.310] [1.394] [1.453] [0.557] 
males aged 40-44 17.037*** 17.991*** 18.358*** 18.861*** 18.781*** 5.793*** 6.443*** 4.049*** 
[3.874] [2.264] [2.261] [2.604] [2.605] [1.623] [1.556] [0.611] 
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males aged 45-49 51.812*** 47.238*** 47.569*** 45.639*** 45.523*** 14.678*** 16.739*** 9.311*** 
[4.568] [2.605] [2.603] [2.945] [2.945] [1.821] [1.682] [0.620] 
males aged 50-54 97.534*** 86.394*** 86.492*** 86.698*** 86.532*** 24.956*** 35.819*** 17.243*** 
[5.971] [3.010] [3.007] [3.435] [3.435] [2.082] [2.078] [0.750] 
males aged 55-59 158.800*** 158.851*** 159.115*** 158.972*** 158.763*** 44.319*** 73.653*** 28.233*** 
[5.513] [3.378] [3.376] [3.860] [3.860] [2.382] [2.397] [0.757] 
males aged 60-64 256.885*** 257.573*** 257.563*** 253.905*** 253.651*** 75.854*** 114.211*** 43.510*** 
[7.790] [4.201] [4.199] [4.812] [4.813] [3.030] [2.961] [0.964] 
males aged 65-69 372.892*** 388.696*** 388.242*** 384.364*** 384.076*** 122.706*** 170.182*** 60.646*** 
[10.292] [5.628] [5.627] [6.359] [6.358] [3.900] [4.186] [1.059] 
males aged 70-74 543.605*** 554.111*** 553.779*** 544.812*** 544.476*** 217.906*** 209.371*** 77.231*** 
[10.572] [6.862] [6.858] [7.874] [7.872] [5.170] [4.778] [1.256] 
males aged 75-79 665.427*** 723.810*** 723.210*** 719.482*** 719.098*** 354.787*** 227.876*** 88.193*** 
[17.597] [8.466] [8.462] [9.880] [9.881] [6.807] [5.785] [1.445] 
males aged 80-84 849.446*** 893.550*** 892.651*** 899.530*** 899.111*** 580.771*** 186.437*** 80.618*** 
[21.208] [11.342] [11.345] [13.266] [13.265] [9.437] [7.498] [1.521] 
males aged over 85 1,054.627*** 1,100.922*** 1,100.030*** 1,110.798*** 1,110.323*** 904.912*** 95.547*** 53.821*** 
[26.048] [13.845] [13.847] [15.887] [15.889] [13.320] [6.495] [1.510] 
females aged < 1 138.289*** 99.636*** 100.181*** 
[15.358] [12.828] [12.838] 
females aged 1-4 -25.905*** -30.018*** -29.581*** -25.498*** -25.526*** -20.387*** -11.985*** 2.534*** 
[4.524] [2.540] [2.532] [3.083] [3.083] [2.039] [1.624] [0.826] 
females aged 5-9 -26.827*** -28.287*** -27.892*** -28.225*** -28.286*** -13.132*** -15.420*** -1.287* 
[3.196] [1.994] [1.986] [2.294] [2.294] [1.413] [1.233] [0.659] 
females aged 10-14 -3.985 -6.166*** -5.632*** -7.875*** -7.994*** -4.513*** -12.549*** 6.306*** 
[3.801] [2.038] [2.034] [2.325] [2.325] [1.415] [1.414] [0.731] 
females aged 15-19 -6.266** -6.412*** -6.346*** -7.919*** -8.042*** 2.209 -11.180*** 0.708 
[3.074] [2.053] [2.046] [2.354] [2.355] [1.549] [1.314] [0.598] 
females aged 20-24 -2.239 -2.425 -3.145 -1.105 -0.539 -2.968* -7.755*** 9.028*** 
[3.564] [2.103] [2.092] [2.418] [2.412] [1.548] [1.425] [0.587] 
females aged 25-29 6.534* 8.078*** 7.911*** 7.637*** 7.858*** -6.935*** -0.321 12.955*** 
[3.594] [2.124] [2.119] [2.419] [2.418] [1.434] [1.409] [0.604] 
females aged 30-34 27.344*** 27.337*** 27.349*** 24.292*** 24.379*** -4.888*** 9.986*** 16.456*** 
[3.796] [2.112] [2.110] [2.430] [2.429] [1.501] [1.392] [0.612] 
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females aged 35-39 42.123*** 41.957*** 42.325*** 39.431*** 39.393*** -3.267* 22.277*** 19.733*** 
[3.740] [2.339] [2.334] [2.671] [2.671] [1.784] [1.571] [0.661] 
females aged 40-44 55.333*** 48.340*** 48.722*** 47.460*** 47.352*** -5.639*** 30.240*** 21.491*** 
[4.127] [2.246] [2.242] [2.560] [2.561] [1.544] [1.555] [0.670] 
females aged 45-49 83.608*** 72.951*** 73.269*** 72.187*** 72.054*** -2.246 43.298*** 27.910*** 
[5.256] [2.587] [2.580] [2.934] [2.934] [1.791] [1.759] [0.759] 
females aged 50-54 116.499*** 99.410*** 99.756*** 100.411*** 100.230*** 3.494* 58.210*** 32.986*** 
[5.475] [2.815] [2.811] [3.258] [3.259] [1.983] [2.037] [0.807] 
females aged 55-59 145.882*** 138.527*** 138.764*** 136.996*** 136.774*** 12.848*** 76.963*** 39.512*** 
[5.613] [3.125] [3.119] [3.515] [3.515] [1.994] [2.254] [0.869] 
females aged 60-64 210.316*** 204.924*** 205.115*** 201.209*** 200.934*** 35.906*** 106.441*** 46.661*** 
[7.340] [3.824] [3.826] [4.287] [4.289] [2.599] [2.621] [0.927] 
females aged 65-69 305.235*** 313.520*** 313.356*** 313.155*** 312.824*** 90.045*** 143.013*** 59.600*** 
[8.924] [4.843] [4.840] [5.541] [5.542] [3.592] [3.319] [1.126] 
females aged 70-74 442.255*** 437.202*** 436.949*** 428.955*** 428.588*** 169.465*** 168.990*** 65.578*** 
[11.018] [5.461] [5.454] [6.295] [6.297] [4.114] [3.871] [1.073] 
females aged 75-79 577.341*** 602.705*** 602.174*** 596.728*** 596.318*** 315.451*** 171.712*** 70.522*** 
[12.413] [6.625] [6.620] [7.800] [7.799] [5.323] [4.575] [1.179] 
females aged 80-84 730.523*** 781.650*** 780.755*** 782.183*** 781.752*** 541.031*** 127.826*** 65.061*** 
[13.866] [7.722] [7.720] [9.122] [9.126] [7.160] [4.230] [1.409] 
females aged over 85 984.768*** 1,059.716*** 1,058.386*** 1,064.372*** 1,063.915*** 882.623*** 77.182*** 35.239*** 
[19.499] [9.295] [9.296] [10.811] [10.812] [8.885] [4.638] [1.095] 
Past hospital encounters 
number of episodes 298.628*** 288.928*** 289.002*** 242.669*** 242.669*** 11.823*** 201.800*** 1.842*** 
[9.938] [4.285] [4.283] [4.081] [4.081] [0.828] [4.328] [0.368] 
number attendances 45.712*** 49.476*** 49.577*** 41.021*** 41.011*** 8.507*** 9.144*** 0.719 
[2.211] [0.593] [0.592] [0.661] [0.661] [0.269] [0.344] [1.254] 
Outpatient priority referral 70.965*** 107.030*** 106.849*** 85.185*** 85.106*** 16.132*** 55.142*** 
-
13.782*** 
[10.590] [3.463] [3.461] [3.659] [3.659] [2.160] [2.155] [1.907] 
Outpatient treatment 55.845*** 37.174*** 36.742*** 27.134*** 27.113*** -19.191*** 40.612*** -8.695*** 
[12.415] [4.790] [4.766] [5.050] [5.050] [3.047] [3.234] [1.488] 
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Past private hospital use 
private attendance  -168.255*** -137.481*** -138.798*** -122.626*** -122.523*** -36.251*** -47.655*** 14.103*** 
[25.153] [13.234] [13.240] [13.795] [13.797] [8.641] [8.464] [3.438] 
private episodes -491.478*** -468.248*** -470.636*** -345.384*** -345.360*** 
-
165.139*** 
-
114.463*** 
-
15.185*** 
[24.625] [15.506] [15.525] [18.348] [18.348] [11.119] [12.090] [2.378] 
Year dummies 
year 2 dummy -24.113*** -23.705*** 27.542*** 27.597*** 26.034*** 1.428 -4.613*** 
[1.446] [1.361] [1.571] [1.571] [0.997] [0.876] [0.396] 
year 3 dummy -21.033*** -20.064*** 32.412*** 32.408*** 28.676*** 4.545*** -3.743*** 
[2.105] [1.796] [1.621] [1.621] [1.055] [0.877] [0.329] 
year 4 dummy -55.337*** -54.373*** 
[1.970] [1.611] 
Attributed needs variables 
in social rented housing 0.342*** 0.306*** 0.347*** 0.386*** 0.407*** 0.356*** -0.005 0.042*** 
[0.101] [0.056] [0.049] [0.056] [0.056] [0.037] [0.032] [0.010] 
disability living allowance 292.772*** 433.599*** 413.832*** 432.916*** 410.730*** 331.005*** 39.095 37.276*** 
[79.592] [48.667] [43.526] [50.657] [50.870] [33.458] [28.855] [8.488] 
no qualifications standardised 23.136*** 19.466*** 20.080*** 18.025*** 17.209*** 7.307*** 5.037*** 1.865*** 
[4.836] [3.383] [2.779] [3.198] [3.200] [2.087] [1.927] [0.487] 
ONS 15: City professionals  -22.845*** 2.345 -4.329 -1.020 -0.410 4.507 2.253 -3.615** 
[7.027] [5.477] [4.980] [5.838] [5.826] [3.694] [3.497] [1.509] 
students in population -1,254.64*** -1,302.84*** -1,315.06*** -1,329.76*** -1,324.40*** -622.02*** -470.47*** 
-
185.95*** 
[138.77] [95.26] [84.15] [97.29] [97.31] [62.90] [55.31] [16.88] 
Disease management 
stroke QOF score -0.664*** -0.090 -0.193** -0.266** -0.255** -0.245*** 0.072 -0.058** 
[0.190] [0.135] [0.085] [0.117] [0.117] [0.078] [0.065] [0.026] 
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Lagged cost variables 
lagged one period individual 
cost 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.053*** 0.205*** 0.558*** 
[0.005] [0.005] [0.002] [0.011] [0.030] 
base period individual cost 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.046*** 0.013 0.088*** 
[0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.011] [0.015] 
base period practice cost 0.032*** 0.024*** 0.023** 0.105*** 
[0.007] [0.008] [0.009] [0.007] 
Constant 130.476*** 72.433*** 112.274*** 88.511*** 76.304*** 23.638** 28.715*** 23.741*** 
[17.584] [10.881] [10.039] [13.788] [13.882] [9.981] [8.037] [2.637] 
Robust standard errors in 
brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note:  The dependent variable in all models is individual hospital cost in a year.  Model 1 is a one period cross-section OLS model with robust standard errors.  Model 2 is a 
fixed (practice) effects model with robust standard errors clustered by general practice. Model 3 is a random (practice) effects model with robust standard errors clustered by 
practice.  Model 4 is the same as model 3 with the addition of lagged individual cost and base period individual cost.  Model 5 is the same as model 4 with the addition of 
baseline practice cost.  Models 6 ± 8 are the same as model 5 but employ a different measure of cost as the dependent variable and as regressors.  All models also contain 
152 ICD10 morbidity dummies and 151 PCT dummies. See Sections 2 and 3 for details. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Full results are in the Working Paper (Dusheiko et al, 
2011). 
 
  
